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Resolving Statutory Ambiguity with a Split
Scienter Approach: The Second Circuit's
Approach to the Federal Mail Order
Drug Paraphernalia Act
INTRODUCTION
In an effort to combat the problem of drug abuse in the United States,
Congress enacted the Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act
("MODPCA")' as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.2 The
purpose of the MODPCA was to eliminate the "scourge of drug abuse"3
afflicting the United States by "reemphasizing that society continues to
oppose any glamorization or acceptance of dangerous drug use.'"
The source for much of the language used in the MODPCA is the
Model Drug Paraphernalia Act ("MDPA").5 The MDPA6 was formulated
in 1979 to assist state legislatures in constructing drug paraphernalia
legislation that could withstand constitutional challenges.7 Similarly, the
drafters of the MODPCA attempted to ensure that that Act would pass
constitutional muster in the federal courts.! In choosing the language for
the MODPCA, however, the drafters deviated significantly from the
' 21 U.S.C. § 857 (1986) (repealed in 1990 and reenacted as 21 U.S.C. § 863 (Supp. 11990)).
The 1990 Act adopted almost verbatim the language of the 1986 Act. The only differences
between the two are that the current statute 1) dropped the predecessor's scheme requirement and 2)
applies to all sales of drug paraphernalia, including intrastate dealings.
' Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3257 (1986) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. I
1990)).
' Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, 1986: Hearings on HR. 1625 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Congressman Mel Levine).
4 Id. at 18.
'Id. at 15 ('I.R. 1625, drafted closely after the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act, deliberately
incorporates much of the same language that is contained in the Act.").
' DRUG ENFoRcEmENr ADMm'srATioN, MODEL DRUG PARPHERNALIA Acr (1979)
[hereinafter MDPA].
7 See Gregory R. Veal, Note, The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act: Can We Outlaw Head
Shops-And Should We?, 16 GA. L. REv. 137, 139 (1981).
' See Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
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language of the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act. This difference in the
language of the two statutes has prompted extensive judicial debate.
The most noticeable difference between the MDPA and the
MODPCA is that the MODPCA, as set forth and eventually adopted as
H.R 1625 in 1986, does not contain the subjective scienter language used
in the MDPA. The MDPA provides: "The term 'Drug Paraphernalia'
means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used,
intended for use, or designed for use, in planting, cultivating ... inhaling,
or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in
violation of this Act."9 In contrast, both the 1986 and 1990 versions of
the MODPCA state only that the term "drug paraphernalia" encompasses
"that which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing,
compounding, converting, concealing ... inhaling, or otherwise
introducing into the human body a controlled substance .... ."
The discrepancy between the language of the MDPA and that of the
MODPCA has resulted in a split among the federal circuit courts over the
proper interpretation of the MODPCA. Specifically, the federal circuit
courts have disagreed over whether the MODPCA involves an objective,
subjective, or split scienter requirement. The Eighth Circuit found that the
MODPCA requires proof of an objective scienter." In contrast, the
Tenth and Sixth Circuits have concluded that the language of the
MODPCA evinces a purely subjective scienter requirement. 2 Finally, the
Third and Second Circuits have concluded that the MODPCA requires a
split scienter approach. 3
This Note initially examines the statutory language 4 and the
legislative history of the MODPCA. Next, the Note presents the three
approaches taken by the Eighth, Tenth, Sixth, Third and Second Circuits
in interpreting the scienter language of the MODPCA.'6 The Note then
proposes that the split scienter approach adopted by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Schneiderman7 should be followed absent a clarifica-
'Id. at 181 (emphasis added) (citing MDPA, art. I).
21 U.S.C. § 857(d) (1986); 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (Supp. 11990) (emphasis added).
"See United States v. Posters 'N'Things, LAd., 969 F.2d 652, 658 (8th Cir. 1992).
12 See United States v. Murphy, 977 F.2d 503, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 57,261
Items of Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d 955, 957-58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989).
" See United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Schneiderrnan,
968 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No.
92-1174).
,See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 38-133 and accompanying text.
17 968 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-
1174).
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tion of the issue by Congress or the United States Supreme Court."8 Of
the three interpretations of the scienter requirement, the split scienter
approach articulated and applied in Schneiderman represents the most
accurate reading of the statutory language and the legislative history of
the MODPCA, and most closely comports with the goals of the Act.
I. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE MODPCA
The MODPCA makes it illegal for any person to "sell or offer for
sale ...; to use the mails ... to transport ...; or to import or export
drug paraphernalia."19 The term "drug paraphernalia" is defined as "any
equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended
or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding ... inhaling, or
otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance
.... "20 To assist courts in interpreting this language, the MODPCA lists
fifteen items of drug paraphernalia that exemplify those that are
"primarily intended or designed for use" with illegal drugs. This list
ranges from multi-use items such as wired cigarette papers to "hard-core"
items such as cocaine freebase kits.2 The MODPCA also identifies eight
"objective" criteria that may be considered in determining whether a
particular item qualifies as drug paraphernalia.' Finally, the MODPCA
identifies two exemptions from application of the Act. First, "any person
authorized by local, State or Federal law to manufacture, possess, or
distribute such items" is exempt from the statute. Second, "any item...
traditionally intended for use with tobacco products" is exempt from the
definition of "drug paraphernalia."'
The legislative history of the MODPCA consists of only one hearing
before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the
Judiciary.24 Although some "ambiguity" is evident from the hearing
testimony,25 the testimony strongly supports a split scienter ap-
' See infra notes 134-59 and accompanying text.
" 21 U.S.C. § 863(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. I 1990).
, 21 U.S.C. § 863(d).
21 U.S.C. § 863(d)(1)415).
21 U.S.C. § 863(e).
21 U.S.C. § 863(f).
Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
See United States v. Posters 'N'Things, 969 F.2d 652, 657 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1288 (E.D. Va. 1990) ('"[S]tray comments by individual legislators, not
otherwise supported by statutory language or committee reports, cannot be attributed to the full body
that voted on the bill.") (citations omitted).
1992-93]
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proach.2 The term "split scienter" refers to an approach that applies either
an objective or a subjective scienter standard, depending on the type of drug
paraphernalia at issue.27 Cases involving hard-core drug paraphernalia
require an objective scienter showing, while cases involving multiple-use
items-items with both legal and illegal uses-require a subjective scienter
showing.2
The individuals testifying in the congressional hearing consistently cited
the "designed for use" language of the MODPCA as mandating an objective
scienter standard. For example, Representative Bill McCollum, in questioning
Representative Mel Levine, a major proponent of H.R. 1625, stated: "[I]t
seems very clear that the word 'designed,' would be very narrow .... If the
cigarette papers were designed for the purpose of use in the drug manufactur-
ing or the inhaling or the use controlled [sic] substances or whatever, that is
fairly clear." The term "designed" signified to McCollum that the objective
features and purposes of the item alone would be enough to establish the
requisite mens rea for the offense." This same approach was endorsed by
Harry Myers,3' general counsel for the Drug Enforcement Administration,
when he spoke of a bong as an example of hard-core drug paraphernalia.
Myers stated: "[Y]ou could find a contrived use for this,... [b]ut actually
this is hard-core drug paraphernalia. You dont have to refer to the merchant's
intent, or the manufacturer's intent, or the guy-this item is designed for use
to smoke marijuana. '32
In contrast to the discussion of the "designed for use" language in the
MODPCA, discussion of the Act's "intended... for use" language33 focused
on the defendant's subjective intent. The dialogue between McCollum and
Levine included the following exchange:
MR. McCOLLUM. What isn't clear is the fact that you have got another
word in there "primarily intended for use."
26 Hearings, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Mr. Levine).
See United States v. Schneiderman, 986 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174). Although not identifying the separate intent
requirements as "split scienter," the court recognizes that paraphernalia "primarily intended" for use
with drugs must be accompanied by the subjective intent of the defendant. On the other hand, where
items are "designed for use" with illegal drugs due to their "objective features," such features
establish per se that they are "designed for use" and the scienter element is met. Id.
21 See Posters 'N'Things, 969 F.2d at 656-57.
Hearings, supra note 3, at 47 (remarks of Rep. Bill McCollum).
3See id.
" The witness' name is spelled as both "Meyers" and 'Myers" in the Hearings. For the purposes
of this Note, he will be referred to as Harry "Myers".
" Hearings, supra note 3, at 68 (testimony of Harry Myers, General Counsel, Drug Enforcement
Administration).
21 U.S.C. § 863(d).
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Do you mean to say that intended, even though it was designed for
multiple uses, that at the time, the seller ... [intended] that [drug
paraphernalia] be used for the purposes described? Is that the intent the
prosecutor would have to prove, the intent of the seller?
MR. LEVINE. The purpose of the language in this section both in
the model act, and in my legislation is to identify as clearly as possible
the intent of manufacture [sic] and the seller to market a particular item
as drug paraphernalia, subject to the interpretation of a trial court.
MR. McCOLLUM. An intent on the part of whom; on the part of
the seller?
MR. LEVINE. Well, it would depend on who is being prosecuted,
if it was the seller, it would be the intent on the part of the seller. It
would be the defendant. It would be the intent on the part of the
defendant in a particular trial.'
It is clear from the above discussion that the drafters of H.R 1625"
intended for the seller's subjective intent to market or sell a particular
item as drug paraphernalia to be an element of proof in certain cases. The
drafters apparently intended for a subjective scienter to apply only in
cases involving multiple-use items. Myers' testimony, which supports this
conclusion, provided:
Those types of items that don't have inherent design characteristics,
that say that they are intended for use with drugs, you call derivative
drug paraphernalia, they can only be controlled by the lawmakers if the
person who is charged with an offense can be shown to have intended
that item for an unlawful use.
It is not necessary to show that intent for someone who is selling
something that is designed for use with drugs.36
I1. THE CIRcuIT SPLIT: THE OBJECTIVE SCIENTER,
SUBJECTIVE SCIENTER AND SPLIT SCIENTER APPROACHES
Soon after the adoption of the MODPCA in 1986, the federal courts
were faced with deciphering congressional intent in deviating from the
subjective scienter language of the MDPA. The language of the
14 Id. at 47-48.
11 Id. at 2-5. The text of H.R. 1625 as presented in the Hearings contained the exact scienter
language later adopted in 21 U.S.C. § 857 (1986), and reenacted in 21 U.S.C. § 863 (Supp. 11990).
Therefore, the argument also applies to the MODPCA as adopted.
"Hearings, supra note 3, at 69 (testimony of Harry Myers).
1992-931
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MODPCA was ambiguous, and the legislative history sparse.37 In the
seminal case relied on by the federal courts, Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside," the United States Supreme Court let stand a village
ordinance requiring "head shop"39 businesses to obtain a license if they
sold items "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or
drugs."4 The Court found that the language "designed for use" was not
unconstitutionally vague on its face, because "the standard encompasses
at least an item that is principally used with illegal drugs by virtue of its
objective features ... ,,4" Furthermore, the Court found that the
"marketed for use" language saved the ordinance from any vagueness
claim, since that language "describes a retailer's intentional display and
marketing of merchandise."'42 Hence, the ordinance required a type of
subjective scienter on the part of the retailer for those items not designed
for use with drugs.43
In interpreting and applying the "primarily intended or designed for
use" language of the MODPCA, the federal courts had only the Hoffman
Estates decision and the legislative history of the Act for guidance. By
1992, three distinct interpretations of the scienter language of the Act had
developed on the circuit court level. The first of these approaches, the
objective approach, interprets the scienter language of the MODPCA as
requiring only proof of the objective features of the item. This is the
approach taken by the Eighth Circuit.' The second approach, the pure
subjective approach, requires proof of intent on the part of the defendant
to sell the drug paraphernalia prohibited by the Act. The Sixth and Tenth
Circuits have adopted this approach.45 Lastly, the Second and Third
"See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
3, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
" The Supreme Court in Hoffman Estates cited the AMERCAN HERI AGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 606 (1980), in defining the term "head" as a slang term for "[o]ne who is a
frequent user of drugs." Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 503 n.20.
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 489.
" Id. at 501.
Id. at 502.
"Id. ("The standard requires scienter, since a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a
particular use without intending that use.").
For a thorough discussion of the Hoffman Estates decision in relation to state drug paraphernalia
laws, see Mark T. Davis, Drug Paraphernalia Laws: Clearing a Legal Haze, 13 CUmB. L. REv. 273
(1982-83); Michael D. Guinan, Note, The Constitutionality of Anti-Drug Paraphernalia Laws-The
Smoke Clears, 58 NOTRE DAmE L. Rnv. 833 (1983); Mark A. Richard, Comment, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.: Revision
or Misapplication? 34 HAsrnS L.J. 1273 (May-July 1983).
"See United States v. Posters 'N'Things, Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 658 (8th Cir. 1992).
"See United States v. Murphy, 911 F.2d 503, 505-06 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 57,261
Items of Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989).
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Circuits have formulated a split scienter approach, which requires a
different standard of proof depending on the type of drug paraphernalia
at issuer6 This last approach, specifically the standard set forth by the
Second Circuit in Schneiderman, is the one this Note endorses as the best
approach in light of the language and legislative history of the MODPCA.
A. The Objective Scienter Approach
The objective scienter approach was first formulated by a federal district
court in Virginia in United States v. Dyer.47 In, Dyer, eighteen defendants
who were charged with various violations of the MODPCA challenged the
statute as unconstitutionally vague. The court in Dyer dealt with this challenge
by stating that the phrase "designed for use" indicated that Congress intended
an objective scienter standard4 Indeed, the language of the statute "indicates
that objective evidence will satisfy the statutory scheme, for the 'design' of an
item can only be analyzed by reference to its objective'physical characteris-
tics.'"9
In regard to the MODPCA's structure, the court found the design of the
statute to be "inconsistent with a purely subjective standard."'5 The court
then rejected the legislative history of the statute as being "ambiguous" and,
as a whole, contradictory." Finally, the court noted that the purpose of
the MODPCA, which is to facilitate a "frontal assault" on the drug
industry by reaching as much drug paraphernalia as possible, would be
better advanced by an objective approach than by a subjective approach,
because it is easier to prove objective intent. 2 The fact that many items
of drug paraphernalia are multi-purpose items did not hinder the court's
" See United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Schneiderman,
968 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (2d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No.
92-1174).
"750 F. Supp. 1278, 1283-94 (E.D. Va. 1990).
"Id. at 1285.
"Id. (noting that the statutory language may be used to identify items of "hard-core'
significance, such as a bong). As additional support for its conclusion, the court noted that the listing
of the fifteen items in § 863(d) would be unnecessary if a defendant's subjective intent were required,
and that § 863(e) lists only oljective criteria. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1286. The fact that wooden pipes
are also listed within § 863(dXl) did not create a problem for the Dyer court since § 863(e) resolves
any ambiguity by exempting items "traditionally" used with tobacco. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1286.
' Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1287. The entire structure of the MODPCA focuses on the item of drug
paraphernalia, rather than any subjective purpose of the defendant. 21 U.S.C. § 863 (Supp. 11990).
" Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1288-89. The court noted several problems with giving the legislative
history "any weight" such as: 1) the absence of committee reports; 2) ambiguities in Levine's
testimony; and 3) the fact that not all of the testimony asserts a purely subjective approach. Id. These
problems are eliminated by using a split-scienter approach.
2 Id. at 1293.
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conclusion, because these items, too, "can only be identified as drug
paraphernalia by means of objective factors."53 In conclusion, the court
summarized the objective standard by stating:
It is enough that the government ... prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the charged items, by virtue of their objective characteristics,
manner of sale, advertising and the like, are §857 drug paraphernalia
and that defendant was aware of the general character and nature of the
items .... [The jury] need not find that a defendant subjectively
intended that a charged item be used with illegal drugs in order to
convict.'
A similar interpretation was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Posters N' Things, Ltd.5 The defendants in Posters
appealed their convictions for selling drug paraphernalia,' claiming
that the MODPCA violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Specifically, the defendants claimed that, because the MODPCA does
not include an express subjective scienter requirement for conviction,
the statute creates a strict liability offense. 7 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the defendants' claim, finding instead that the MODPCA
contains an objective scienter requirement similar to the one estab-
lished in United States v. Dyer.5"
In reaching its conclusion, the Posters court first noted that a
traditional subjective scienter approach would place too great a burden
on the government in obtaining convictions. 9 Moreover, the court
found nothing in the language of the MODPCA to indicate that
Congress intended a purely subjective scienter requirement.' Indeed,
the court determined that the phrase "primarily intended or designed
for use" establishes an objective scienter requirement since the term
"designed" refers to the objective features of an item of drug
paraphernalia, not the intent of the seller or manufacturer.6 The court
"Id. Although it is not clear what the court was referring to, it appears that the "objective
factors" are the eight factors listed in 21 U.S.C. § 863(e).
Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1293.
969 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1992).
"Id. at 654. The items involved were pipes, bongs, scales, roach clips, and cocaine mirrors.
"Id. at 656; see United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 249 (1952) (reiterating the rule that
strict liability criminal statutes may only be applied to regulatory offenses or offenses involving a
small penalty).
"Posters, 969 F.2d at 658 (citing Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1286-87 (E.D. Va. 1990)).
Id. at 657; see also Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1290.
Posters, 969 F.2d at 657.
"Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
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found additional support for its conclusion in the language of Dyer62 and
in the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Hoffman Estates.'
The Posters court also looked to other provisions within the
MODPCA to support its conclusion. Relying heavily on Dyer, the court
noted that section 863(d) of the Act," which lists fifteen items that
exemplify those primarily intended or designed for illegal purposes,
contains only items which by their objective features alone indicate use
with illegal drugs.6' Likewise, the omission of the defendant's subjective
intent from section 863(e)'s list of objective criteria to consider in
deciding whether a particular item is drug paraphernalia!' indicates that
the defendant's subjective intent is irrelevant.67 Finally, the court stated:
mT1he whole structure of section 857 supports an objective scienter
reading: first the statute "provides a definition and enumerates examples
of drug paraphernalia," then "it sets forth various objective factors to be
assessed, followed finally by specific, objectively based exclusions. The
entire structure focuses on the items of drug paraphernalia, not on the
purposes of the defendant."'
The court in Posters, like the court in Dyer, did not fird the
legislative history of the statute persuasive as to either the subjective or
the objective scienter approach.69 Although it did "consider" the
legislative history, the court stated that it remained "unconvinced ...
[because] what little legislative history exists is either contradictory or of
no help in interpreting the statute."7
Having found that the MODPCA requires an objective scienter, the
Posters court addressed the defendants' claim that the statute unconstitu-
tionally creates a strict liability offense. The court rejected the defendants'
11 Because these items may be identified by their physical characteristics and design
features, there is no need for a demonstration of the defendant's subjective intent. Where
the illicit purpose of the manufacturer or designer is embodied in the object itself, that
purpose is apparent to all who perceive the object. "All that is required is for persons to
open their eyes to the 'objective realities' of the items sold in their businesses."
Id. (quoting Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1285 (citations omitted)).
" Id. (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982) (The "designed
for use" language "encompasses at least an item that is principally used with illegal drugs by virtue
of its objective features.")).
"21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (Supp. I 1990).
,Posters, 969 F.2d at 658.
"21 U.S.C. § 863(e) (Supp. 11990).
"Posters, 969 F.2d at 658.
"Id. (quoting United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (E.D. Va. 1990)).
Id. at 657; see also Dyer, 750 F. Supp. at 1288-89.
Posters, 969 F.2d at 657 n.3.
1992-93]
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argument, noting that the MODPCA "does not concern conduct prohibited
at common law ... and, therefore ... is not unconstitutional simply on
the basis that it does not contain a traditional subjective scienter
requirement."' In support of this conclusion, the court cited several
statutory provisions that were held to be constitutional even though they
penalized conduct deemed criminal and contained severely modified
scienter requirements or no scienter requirement at all.72
B. The Subjective Scienter Approach
As more courts were forced to interpret the scienter language of the
MODPCA, many variations on a single basic approach, which this Note
classifies under the "subjective scienter" approach, evolved. In all of
these cases, the courts interpreted the "primarily intended or designed for
use" language to require proof of the defendant's intent to sell the items
as drug paraphernalia, although the exact burden placed upon the
government in proving this intent differed for each court.
The first court to adopt a pure subjective scienter interpretation was
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in United
States v. Main Street Distributing.73 In Main Street Distributing, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the MODPCA on three grounds:
(1) the definition of drug paraphernalia was impermissibly vague as
applied; (2) the absence of a scienter requirement violates due process;
and (3) the burden of proof with respect to intent is unjustifiably shifted
to the defendant.74 The court concentrated on defendant's second claim
and rejected it after concluding that the "definitional language of § 857,
its legislative history and the interpretation of similar clauses in other
statutes" support the imposition of a subjective scienter requirement.75
The court also stated:
[Section 857's] focus is simply on a defendant's use of the mails ... to
facilitate transactions involving items that a defendant has designed or
71 Id. at 659.
7 See id. (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 (1974) (holding that an obscenity
statute does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew that the materials were
obscene); Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir.) (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 5851, which
prohibits possession of certain firearms, does not require proof of scienter), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
913 (1963)); see also States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Eagle, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986), as supporting a similar conclusion-that the absence of a scienter
requirement would not render the MODPCA unconstitutional).
"700 F. Supp. 655, 663-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
"Id. at 663.
"Id. at 666.
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intends for use as drug paraphernalia.... [S]o long as drug para-
phernalia is defined by the defendant's intent, there can be no question
... as to Congress's ability to regulate such conduct. ... 76
One year later, in United States v. 57,261 Items of Drug Para-
phernalia,' the Sixth Circuit confronted an issue similar to the one
decided in Main Street Distributing. In 57,261 Items of Drug
Paraphernalia, the court reviewed two drug paraphernalia cases in
which the government sought civil forfeiture of certain drug parapher-
nalia owned by the defendants. The defendants challenged the action
by asserting that the MODPCA was unconstitutionally vague, or, in
the alternative, had been misapplied in their cases.' The court,
relying on Hoffman Estates, stated that "it is clear that the federal
statute may not be applied under its terms to items intended for
innocent use. The statute requires intent .... The explicit intent
requirement saves the statute from this claim of vagueness."'7 The
court then defined the intent requirement, stating that "[t]he statute
requires an intent to distribute the items for drug use. The person to
whom the statute is being applied ... must have knowledge that there
is a strong probability that the items will be used in this way."80
Thus, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the statute's "primarily intended or
designed for use" language to mandate a subjective scienter showing
by the prosecution."1 The court therefore concluded that the Act, on
its face and as applied, is valid, and upheld the defendants' convic-
tions.8 2
In United States v. 3520 Brighton Boulevard," the court was
confronted with a civil forfeiture action in which the defendants
sought dismissal based on the argument that the MODPCA was
facially void for vagueness." The 3520 Brighton Boulevard court,
relying on Hoffrman Estates5 and basic canons of statutory construc-
'Id. (emphasis added).
n 869 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.), cerl denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989).
Id. at 956.
n Id. at 957.
'Id.
" Id. But see United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1290 (E.D. Va. 1990) (citing 57,261
Items of Drug Paraphernalia as establishing an objective scienter requirement: "The Sixth Circuit
... implicitly approved the objective approach when it upheld the district court's conclusion that 'in
this country these items are intended for use with controlled substances."' (citations omitted)).
57,261 Items of Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d at 958.
"785 F. Supp. 141 (D. Colo. 1992).
Id. at 142 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982)).
Id. at 143 ("[A] law's vagueness may be ameliorated if it requires proof of scienter or mens
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tion," determined that the employment of a subjective scienter require-
ment cures any vagueness present in the MODPCA.' The court cited the
language and the legislative history of the MODPCA in support of its
conclusion that Congress intended a subjective scienter requirement.ss
Based upon these two factors, the court formulated the following
standard: "[T]he government must prove that a defendant knew an item
to be drug paraphernalia and intended that the item be used for a drug-
related purpose before [the government] can establish a violation of
§ 863."" Such a subjective scienter requirement successfully avoids the
"trap for the innocent" problem that so often arises with vagueness
challenges" because, under the subjective scienter approach, a defendant
cannot be convicted merely for selling an item that falls under the
definition of drug paraphernalia. Instead, the government must prove that
the defendant knew and intended the item to be used with illegal drugs.
The Tenth Circuit recently adopted a subjective scienter approach to
the MODPCA in United States v. Murphy.91 In Murphy, the trial court
had dismissed a twelve-count indictment charging the defendants with
various violations of the MODPCA. The district court found that the
MODPCA was unconstitutionally vague for not providing a scienter
requirement.92 Relying on United States v. Schneiderman,93 the Tenth
Circuit reversed, ruling that "a scienter standard is 'implied by the
wording of the definitional section."" Indeed, the court in Murphy
rea, especially with respect to adequacy of notice that given conduct is proscribed." (quoting Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. at 499)).
" Id. ("The failure of Congress explicitly and unambiguously to indicate whether mens rea is
required does not signal a departure from this background assumption of our criminal law...
(quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
Id. at 144.
' Id. at 143. The 3520 Brighton Boulevard court also relied upon the Sixth Circuit's
interpretation of the MODPCA in 57,261 Items of Drug Paraphernalia as requiring "subjective
scienter." Id.
" Id. at 144.
90Id.
1 977 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1992). A federal district court in Florida, in United States v. Tobacco
Emporium, No. 91-227-CR-T-17, 1992 WL 80624 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (unreported opinion), also
recently touched upon the scienter issue in deciding the probable cause burden required to establish
a violation of the MODPCA. The court stated that "the government must establish a reasonable belief
that some person knowingly used the Postal Service ... as part of a scheme to sell drug
paraphernalia and a reasonable belief that the items being sold were items of drug paraphernalia."
Id. at *2. Thus, the Middle District of Florida would apparently require a showing of subjective
scienter.
92 Murphy, 977 F.2d at 504.
- 968 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-
1174).
" Murphy, 977 F.2d at 504 (quoting Schneiderman, 968 F.2d at 1567).
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expressly "adopt[ed] the position of [its] sister circuit" in finding that the
MODPCA requires proof of scienter. s The court then turned to the task
of defining the MODPCA's scienter requirement. Based upon the
legislative history, the language of the MODPCA, and the reasoning of
the Schneiderman court, the Murphy court stated: "[W]e find Defendant's
arguments insufficient to override the strong presumption that § 857
required proof of criminal intent. We therefore hold that the 'primarily
intended' language in § 857(d) constitutes the requisite scienter element
of the offense charged."96 Specifically, the statute requires proof of the
"intent of the defendant on trial.'97 Although the court relied on
Schneiderman, the Tenth Circuit failed to deal with the "designed for use"
language of the statute. As a result, the court in Murphy in effect interpreted
the scienter language of the MODPCA as mandating a pure subjective
scienter approach rather than the split scienter approach adopted in
Schneiderman 8
C. The Split Scienter Approach
In United States v. Schneiderman,99 the Second Circuit reversed a
federal district court's holding that the MODPCA was unconstitutionally
vague."° The defendants in Schneiderman had moved to dismiss a
fourteen-count indictment that charged them with selling and conspiring
to sell drug paraphernalia through the use of an interstate conveyance
and with laundering and conspiring to launder money.' The district
court found the omission of the MDPA's intent language from the
MODPCA to be a controlling factor in concluding that Congress intended
proof of scienter to be unnecessary for a conviction under the
MODPCA102 In distinguishing the Hoffinan Estates decision,"3 the
district court stated that the drug paraphernalia ordinance in Hoffman
Estates was "regulatory in nature,"'" while a criminal statute such as
" Id. at 505. The court also cited Schneiderman in support of its conclusion that the MODPCA
is not vague on its face and as applied. Id. at 504 (citing Scneidernan, 968 F.2d at 1568).
"Id. at 505-06.
"Id. at 506.
"See infra notes 99-118 and accompanying text.
"968 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-
1174).
United States v. Schneiderman, 777 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 266.
" See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
For example, the ordinance at issue in Hoffman Estates only imposed a fine of $I0.00 to
$500.00 for selling drug paraphernalia with a license. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455
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the MODPCA requires "a greater degree of specificity."'' 5 After some
discussion of the legislative history and prior case law, the district court then
concluded that "the statute is nothing more than a 'convenient tool for harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by... prosecuting officials, against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure."'"0 6 Accordingly, the district court
held that the MODPCA violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."°7
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion, stating:
"Because we conclude that § 857 includes a scienter requirement, it is not
unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to defendants."'08 Moreover,
the court found the "primarily intended or designed for use" language to be
indicative of congressional intent to require some showing of mental state,
despite the fact that the language of the MODPCA does not conform
verbatim with the MDPA's scienter language."e In defining MODPCA's
scienter requirement, the court essentially proposed a two-category ap-
proach."' ' The first category is composed of derivative (i.e., multi-purpose)
drug paraphernalia and requires the government to prove subjective scienter
on the part of the defendant."' The second category involves hard-core drug
paraphernalia that by the nature of its objective features "establish per se that
[it is] designed for use with illegal drugs ....,,
The Schneiderman court found support for this categorical approach to
the scienter requirement in the legislative history and prior case law on the
MODPCA. Relying in part on Mel Levine's testimony before the House
Subcommittee that the language "primarily intended for use" requires intent
on the part of the defendant,"' the court found that a showing of the
subjective intent of the person charged. with the offense is necessary for
derivative items."' This subjective scienter requirement involves a showing
U.S. 489, 492 (1982).
" Schneiderman, 777 F. Supp. at 270.
I. Id. at 271 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940))).
107 Id.
'" United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d 1564, 1565 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174).
'" Id. at 1566. The departure-type reasoning that was successful in the district court, and
unsuccessful in the court of appeals, was also used in another Second Circuit case, United States v.
Hong-Laing Lin, 962 F.2d 251, 256-57 (2d Cir. 1992), but only to prove that Congress, in expressly
listing the fifteen items of drug paraphernalia in 21 U.S.C. § 863(d), did not intend for cocaine vials
to be covered under the MODPCA.
10 See Schneiderman, 968 F.2d at 1567.
'"Id.
112 Id.
. Id. (citing Hearings, supra note 3, at 47-48); see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
"' Schneiderman, 968 F.2d at 1567.
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by the government that the "defendant knew there was a strong
possibility" that items would be used with illegal drugs, not that "the
items would necessarily be used in connection with illegal drugs."" 5
In discussing the second category, the court cited Hoffman Estates and
Dyer in support of the proposition that the phrase "designed for use"
within a drug paraphernalia statute covers an item that is "'principally
used with illegal drugs by virtue of its objective features."' 6
Relying on these decisions, the Second Circuit concluded that "if
the objective features of an item establish per se that it is 'designed
for use' with illegal drugs, the scienter element is satisfied.""7 Since
the Schneiderman court had recognized a scienter requirement for the
MODPCA, the defendant's vagueness claims necessarily failed."'
In United States v. Mishra,"9 the Third Circuit faced a constitu-
tional challenge to the MODPCA similar to the one resolved in
Schneiderman. Like the court in United States v. Murphy,2 ° the
Mishra Court relied to a large extent on Schneiderman.' In Mishra,
the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to a twelve-count
indictment but reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of
the MODPCA.' On appeal, Mishra argued that the MODPCA was
unconstitutionally vague and that the statute impermissibly created a
strict liability offense." After examining the legislative history and
the language of the statute, the court rejected Mishra's strict liability
theory, stating that "Congress intended to include an intent provision
in § 857. The key language is contained in subsection § 857(d), which
describes 'drug paraphernalia' to include those items 'primarily
intended or designed for use' with illegal drugs.' 24
In defining the scienter standard required by the MODPCA, the
Third Circuit began by noting that the MODPCA involves "two
points" of proof by the government." First, the government must
show that the defendant intended to sell, or offer for sale, the items
"' Id.
... Id. (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1987); United States
v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-86 (E.D. Va. 1990)).
117 Id.
... Id. at 1567-68.
, 979 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1992).
977 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1992).
" Mishra, 979 F.2d at 306.
' Id. at 303.
12 Id.
, Id. at 306 (quoting United States v. Schneidemian, 968 F.2d. 1564, 1566 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174)).
"I Id. at 307.
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at issue. 6 Second, the government must demonstrate that the items at
issue are "drug paraphernalia" as defined by the statute.'27 Like the
Schneiderman court, the court in Mishra held that the government could
meet its burden in one of two ways.' One approach is for the govern-
ment to establish that the item is "primarily intended" for drug use. To
do so, the government must establish that "the defendant seller contem-
plated, or reasonably expected ... that the item sold or offered for sale
would be used with illegal drugs."'' 9 This could be proven by evidence
such as the "manner in which the item was displayed, how it was
advertised, ... or any of the other factors listed in § 863(e) which the
statute suggests should be considered.'.. In other cases, the government
may establish that the items were "designed for use" with illegal
drugs.'' Unlike the decision in Schneiderman, however, under the
Mishra holding, an individual would be convicted only if "the defendant
seller was aware of the general nature of the item-i.e., that the defendant
knew that the item sold or offered for sale is generally known to be used
with illegal drugs."'3 Hence, the government must prove intent even for
items primarily designed for drug use. Such intent "may be inferred by
the jury from extrinsic factors such as those listed in § 863(e)."''
III. AN ARGUMENT iN FAvOR OF THE SCHNEIDERMAN
SPLIT SCIENTER APPROACH
The federal circuit courts have struggled in interpreting the MODPCA
due to the ambiguity of the Act's scienter language. The fact that several
circuit courts have read the same seemingly simple language as mandat-
ing such divergent scienter requirements emphasizes that Congress must
rectify this problem of interpretation. Unfortunately, Congress is not
likely to remedy this problem soon, considering that it failed to amend or
clarify the scienter language when it reenacted the MODPCA in 1990."
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, which obviously could
122 Id.
' Id.
12 Id.
'z Id.
130 Id.
.. Id. at 308.
132 Id.
" Id. Examples of the extrinsic factors to be considered are "instructions . . . provided with the
item," "national and local advertising," and expert testimony. 21 U.S.C. § 863(e)(1), (2) & (8) (Supp.
11990).
" See supra note 1.
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resolve the MODPCA scienter dilemma, recently declined an opportunity
to do so."35 Absent a clarification of the issue by Congress or the
Supreme Court, federal courts should follow the split scienter approach
as set forth by the Second Circuit in United States v. Schneiderman.3 '
The Schneiderman approach is logically consistent with the MODPCA's
language and legislative history, the majority of prior decisions on the
issue, and the due process rights of the defendants.
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Mishra purported to
adopt the split scienter approach taken by the Second Circuit in
Schneiderman,37 the actual split scienter standard adopted in Mishra is
quite different. For example, the Third Circuit adopted a tougher standard
for items "designed for use" with illegal drugs, requiring that the
government prove that the defendant "knew that the item sold ... is
generally known to be used with drugs."'3 Hence, the government must
prove intent on the part of the defendant, no matter the type of drug
paraphernalia. Schneiderman, in contrast, permits the scienter requirement
to be satisfied by the objective features of the item alone.'39 One major
benefit of the Schneiderman approach is that it places a lesser burden on
the government for hard-core paraphernalia, while continuing to protect
defendants from unjust convictions involving multi-use items. By
requiring a showing of intent for items of hard-core drug paraphernalia,
the Mishra court removed virtually all the benefits of an objective
standard. I
The scienter language of the MODPCA indicates that both a
subjective and an objective scienter should be considered, not one or the
other.4 The court in United States v. Posters 'N' Things, Ltd.4'
effectively ignored the "primarily intended ... for use" language of
section 863(d)142 when it concluded that the phrase "designed for use"
mandated a purely objective scienter.'43 The solution offered by the
Dyer court-that the defendant's intent can be determined by objective
criteria"-does not comport with the normal usage of the term "intend-
... United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512
(U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174).
" 968 F.2d 1564 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-
1174).
... See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
"' See United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 306-08 (3d Cir. 1992).
"' See Schneidennan, 968 F.2d at 1567.
"See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
", United States v. Posters 'N'Things, Ltd., 969 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1992).
21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (Supp. 11990).
", Posters, 969 F.2d at 657; see supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
'"See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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ed." The term "intended" normally signifies a defendant's subjective
intent, which, although it can be established by circumstantial evidence,
is not truly considered with an objective scienter.'45 Likewise, the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits, in concluding that the MODPCA requires proof of a
subjective intent on the part of the defendant in all cases, ignored the
"designed for use" language of the MODPCA. It is inconceivable that
Congress would have intended an entire section of the scienter
language of the Act to be disregarded.
The question remains, then, as to why the circuit courts interpret-
ed the scienter language as requiring either a purely objective or a
purely subjective scienter. Two possible reasons for requiring a purely
objective approach are a desire for simplicity in application and
political conservativism. Similarly, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits may
have chosen a subjective standard in order to maintain consistency
and protect the rights of the criminal defendants. None of these
reasons, however, can justify such heavy-handed manipulation of the
plain language of the Act. The Schneiderman approach avoids this
type of manipulation and, unlike the interpretations of other courts,
gives meaning to the entire scienter phrase of section 863(d).4
Although the legislative history on the MODPCA is sparse, the
testimony of Mel Levine and Harry Myers clarifies the intent of the
drafters in choosing the scienter language of the MODPCA.' 47 Any
ambiguity that arises from the "contradictory" testimony of the
Congressmen is resolved when read in light of the split scienter
approach set forth in Schneiderman. Indeed, both Levine and Myers
alluded to a differentiation between multi-purpose items and hard-core
items. Multi-purpose or derivative items require a consideration of the
intent of the defendant.'" Hard-core items, on the other hand,
require a consideration of the objective features of the item, rather
than the mental state of the defendant.
49
A case such as Hoffman Estates'50 illustrates a proper reading of
scienter language. Although the language of the city ordinance at
issue in Hoffman Estates was different from that of the MODPCA, the
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990) (defining intent as "a state of mind in which
a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course of action."); WEBsrw's THiRD NEW
INTER4ATnoNAL DicrioNARY 1176 (1986) (defining intent as "having the mind or will concentrated
on some end or purpose.').
1,, 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (Supp. I 1990).
47 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
i Hearings, supra note 3, at 48 (statement of Mel Levine) and 69 (statement of Harty Myers).
' , See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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analysis undertaken and conclusions drawn by the Supreme Court are
persuasive. The city ordinance in Hoffinan Estates involved items
"designed or marketed for use with" drugs. The Supreme Court interpret-
ed the "designed for use" language as requiring an objective scienter that
could be established by "virtue of [the items'] objective features, i.e.,
features designed by the manufacturers,"15' and the "marketed for use"
language as requiring a type of subjective scienter analysis." The
Schneiderman court's approach is very similar to the approach implicitly
condoned in Hoffman Estates,'53 in that the Schneiderman court gives
each phrase of the MODPCA its own meaning." 4 Also, the fact that
every United States Court of Appeals that has addressed the issue, except
for the court in Posters, has interpreted the scienter language of the
MODPCA to require some proof of the defendant's subjective intent'55
indicates that a normal reading of the statute would mandate the use of
a subjective scienter for at least certain items.
Finally, the split scienter approach taken in Schneiderman strikes an
appropriate balance between the government's legitimate goal of disabling
the illegal drug industry by curtailing the drug paraphernalia industry and
the defendant's due process rights and general interest in protection from
ambiguous criminal statutes. The specific subjective scienter standard set
forth in Schneiderman-t hat the defendant need only know that there is a
strong possibility that the items of paraphernalia would be used with
illegal drugs 5 -alleviates much of the burden that a stricter requirement,
such as the one set forth in United States v. 3520 Brighton Boulevard,
57
would place on the government. In addition to aiding the government, the
split scienter standard protects the defendant from the possible adverse
consequences of a purely objective standard58 and from the "trap of the
. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 501 (1982).
.. Id. at 502.
' Id. at 501.
,4United States v. Schneiderman, 968 P.2d 1564, 1567 (2d Cir. 1992), cer. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174).
'" United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring a split scienter approach);
United States v. Murphy, 977 F.2d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 1992) (requiring proof of criminal intent);
Schneiderman, 968 F.2d at 1567 (requiring a split scienter approach); United States v. 57,261 Items
of Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 933 (1989) (requiring "an
intent to distribute the items ..
Schneiderman, 968 F.2d at 1567; see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
'"785 F. Supp. 141, 144 (D. Colo. 1992) ("[T]he government must prove that a defendant knew
an item to be drug paraphernalia and intended that the item be used for drug-related purposes!).
... This is especially true considering that the penalty for a violation of the MODPCA is a
maximum of three years imprisonment, a possible high fine, and seizure and forfeiture of the items
by the government. 21 U.S.C. § 863(b), (c) (Supp. 11990).
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innocent" with which the 3520 Brighton Boulevard court was so con-
cerned.'59
CONCLUSION
Difficulties involving application of the MODPCA in light of
discrepancies between the MDPA's scienter language and the scienter
language of the MODPCA arose soon after the MODPCA's passage in
1986. This disagreement has led to a distinct split of interpretation
between the circuits with the rendering of conflicting decisions in the
Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits. The Tenth and Sixth
Circuits, in Murphy and 57,261 Items of Drug Paraphernalia, interpreted
the MODPCA as requiring some type of subjective scienter-one that
would force the prosecution to prove that the defendant understood that
the item would be used with illegal drugs. 6 In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit in Posters interpreted the language of the MODPCA as involving
a purely objective scienter requirement, reasoning that the objective
scienter approach, as first set forth in Dyer, best addressed the goals of
Congress in adopting the legislation and was a "proper" reading of the
MODPCA.'6 Finally, the Second and Third Circuits, in Schneiderman
and Mishra, found that the statute requires a split scienter approach,
depending on the type of item at issue in the case. 62 In the Second
Circuit, where the item is hard-core paraphernalia the prosecution may
establish a violation of the MODPCA by focusing on the objective
features of the item. Where the item has multiple uses, proof that the
defendant knew that there was a strong possibility that the item would be
used with illegal drugs is required. In the Third Circuit, proof of intent
must be established for both types of paraphernalia but items of hard-core
paraphernalia require satisfying a lesser burden of proof than that applied
in the case of multi-use items. 63
The standard set forth in Schneiderman is clearly the best approach
considering the language and legislative history of the MODPCA and the
150 3520 Brighton Boulevard, 785 F. Supp. at 143; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
United States v. Murphy, 977 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 57,261 Items
of Drug Paraphernalia, 869 F.2d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 1989).
... United States v. Posters 'N'Things, Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 657-58 (8th Cir. 1992); see supra
notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
,,2 United States v. Mishra, 979 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussed supra at notes 125-33
and accompanying text); United States v. Schneiderman, 968 F.2d 1564, 1567 (2d Cir. 1992), cerl.
denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-1174) (discussed supra at notes 110-18 and
accompanying text).
'" See supra notes 128-32.
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defendant's constitutional interests. Besides these factors, Schneiderman
also allows for just results. In situations involving hard-core drug
paraphernalia, the items are such that the defendant should not be
permitted to plead ignorance-a cocaine freebase kit has no uses other
than those connected with cocaine. On the other hand, when dealing with
multi-purpose items, such as rolling papers or certain types of pipes, a
defendant could very well intend to use the items in totally legal ways.
The Schneiderman standard adequately protects such a defendant from the
unjust application of an excessively objective standard of proof.
Theresa A. Kleine-Kracht

